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Article 9

Perry v. Bartlett: A Preliminary Test for Campaign Finance

Reform
Prompted by the 2000 presidential election, independent issue
advertisements have resurfaced as one area of concern for campaign
finance reform advocates.' These advertisements are designed to
impact an election without endorsing or opposing a specific
candidate.2 Many reform advocates support imposing registration
and disclosure requirements on independent advocacy organizations
similar to those imposed on organizations taking an explicit position
on an individual candidate. While compelling arguments exist for
restricting money's prevalence in the electoral system,4 legislative
restraints on campaign financing run perilously close to infringing
upon First Amendment free speech rights.5 In Perry v. Bartlett,6 the
1. See Harold E. Ford, Jr. & Jason M. Levien, A New Horizonfor CampaignFinance
Reform, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 308-09 (2000) (listing the rising costs of political
campaigns, concerns about the integrity of the democratic process, excessive influence of
special interests, and distraction of elected leaders as compelling reasons for campaign
finance reform); Janet Hook, McCain Sees New Hope for Campaign Bill, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 30,2000, at A5 (discussing the push for campaign finance reform); Karen Masterson,
Many See Remarks by Bush as Attack on FinanceReform, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 16,2001,
at A2 (detailing Senator McCain's opposition to soft money and issue advocacy); Norman
Ornstein, Balance Free Speech, Disclosure, USA TODAY, Mar. 19, 2001, at 15A (stating
that over $300 million was spent on issue advertisements in the 2000 election).
2. Richard Briffault, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC: The Beginning of
the End of the Buckley Era?,85 MINN. L. REv. 1729, 1735, 1737-38 (2001) (discussing the
distinction between express advocacy and issue advocacy); Richard E. Levy, Defining
Express Advocacy for Purposesof Campaign Finance Reporting and Disclosure Laws, 8
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, Spring 1999, at 90, 95-96 (describing issue advocacy and
contrasting it with express advocacy); Norman J. Ornstein, Limits on So-Called "Issue
Advocacy" Will Pass ConstitutionalTest, ROLL CALL, Mar. 19, 2001, at 7 (describing the
nature of issue advocacy advertisements).
3. Kirk L. Jowers, Issue Advocacy: If It Cannot Be Regulated When It Is Least
Valuable, It Cannot Be Regulated When It Is Most Valuable, 50 CATH. U.L. REv. 65, 65-66
(2000) (discussing the scramble to regulate issue advertisements as part of campaign
finance reform); Ornstein, supra note 2 (calling for reform that includes issue
advertisements); Bennett Roth, Bush, McCain Huddle Over Campaign Reform, HOUS.
CHRON., Jan. 25, 2001, at Al (discussing popular reform ideas involving bans on soft
money); Editorial, Soft-Money Ban Could Lead Way on Election Reform, KAN. CITY
STAR, Jan. 2,2001, at B6 (stating that McCain's reform ideas are popular with voters).
4. These arguments include preventing corruption in the political process and
providing equal political opportunity to the entire electorate. See infra notes 38-63 and
accompanying text.
5. Joel M. Gora, Buckley v. Valeo: A Landmark of PoliticalFreedom, 33 AKRON L.
REv. 7, 8-11 (1999) (discussing the dangers campaign finance regulations present to First
Amendment rights).
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United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit strictly
adhered to the express advocacy test laid down by the Supreme Court
in Buckley v. Valeo, 7 which reinforced earlier Supreme Court case law
favoring the protection of political speech. The Fourth Circuit's
decision indicates that the circuit courts will view the pending
legislation as unconstitutional unless the Supreme Court changes its
approach to the regulation of political speech.'
This Recent
Development argues for the re-characterization of issue advocacy
advertisements as a component of a candidate's overall campaign and
the establishment of an objective test for determining whether an
advertisement constitutes express advocacy in order to facilitate the
successful implementation of campaign finance reform.
In Perry, the Fourth Circuit based its reasoning on Buckley's
holding9 that although protected political expression often must be
achieved through the expenditure of money,1" the dangers of
unlimited monetary contributions warrant regulation." Although the
Supreme Court has held that some regulation of political speech can
pass the requisite strict scrutiny test, 2 it has excluded many types of
6. 231 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 2000) (per curiam).
7. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
8. Perry, 231 F. 3d at 161-62.
9. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44. The Court stated that the "[d]iscussion of public issues
and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system
of government established by our Constitution. The First Amendment affords the
broadest protection to such political expression." Id. at 14.
10. The Court stated that "[a] restriction on the amount of money a person or group
can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity
of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration,
and the size of the audience reached." Id. at 19. The Court also noted that campaign
contributions play a significant role in political dialogue, which could be severely impacted
if contribution limits were too strict. Id. at 21.
11. A regulation that imposes any burden on political expression must meet the strict
scrutiny test to be constitutional. See id. at 16 (stating that exacting scrutiny, as set out by
the First Amendment, is required); Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens
for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 251-52, 256 (1986) (stating that state imposed burdens on
political speech must be justified by a compelling state interest).
12. In Buckley, the Supreme Court stated that limiting personal contributions to a
candidate was only a marginal restriction on free speech. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-22. The
Court noted that while contributions to a candidate indicate a "general expression of
support," there is only a minimal relationship between the size of a contribution and the
underlying level of support. Id. at 21. In its decision, the Court determined that the
government's interest in preventing corruption was sufficiently compelling to justify the
burdens contribution limits placed on First Amendment rights. Id. at 25-29; see also
Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 669 (1990) (upholding the
constitutionality of a statute that prohibits corporations from making contributions and
expenditures regarding state elections). But see Martin H. Redish, Free Speech and the
FlawedPostulates of Campaign FinanceReform, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 783, 796-98 (2001)
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political speech from regulation by using the "express advocacy"
test.13 This test requires the use of "explicit words of advocacy of
election or defeat of a candidate" in a communication before it may
be regulated. 4 The Fourth Circuit followed this bright-line test in
Perry, and other courts have applied the test consistently in numerous
political speech cases. 5
In Perry, after the Fourth Circuit determined that the
constitutionality of North Carolina General Statute section 12A had
not been mooted by North Carolina Right to Life v. Bartlett,6 the
(arguing that campaign contributions are "a form of pure expressive activity," thus fitting
"within the framework of free speech").
13. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44; see Kathleen M. Sullivan, PoliticalMoney and Freedom of
Speech, 30 U.C. DAviS L. REV. 663, 667 (1997) (stating that Buckley was an attempt to
split the difference between "two of our most powerful traditions: equality in the realm of
democratic polity, and liberty in the realm of political speech").
14. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 43. Courts have referred to the "express advocacy" test as a
"prophylactic definition" to give the widest safeguards to First Amendment freedoms.
Federal Election Comm'n v. Christian Action Network, 110 F.3d 1049, 1052 (1997). The
Supreme Court attempted to give meaning to the term "express advocacy" by listing
words that potentially could qualify an advertisement as political speech worthy of
regulation. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52. Among some of the words and phrases listed by
the Court were: "vote for," "elect," "support," "cast your ballot for," "Smith for
Congress," "vote against," "defeat," and "reject." IL The Ninth Circuit has stated that
this list was meant as a guide for future application of the "express advocacy" test and was
not intended to be exclusive. Federal Election Comm'n v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 862-63
(9th Cir. 1987) (stating that words for the purpose of determining advocacy should not be
considered in isolation, but in the context of the entire communication). The court
emphasized the Supreme Court's focus on literal speech and words in the text of
communications. Id. The Supreme Court declined to adopt an all-inclusive rule that
would permit regulation of any political speech mentioning a candidate and his or her
stance on an issue because the "distinction between discussion of issues and candidates
and advocacy of election or defeat of candidates may often dissolve in practical
application." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42. The Court was concerned about the difficulty in
applying an interpretative test and thus opted for a bright-line test. Id. at 44. This
decision effectively excluded issue advertisements from government regulation so long as
they do not expressly support or oppose a candidate. Id
15. See, e.g., Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Williams, 187 F.3d 963, 969 (8th Cir.
1999) (stating that questions of intent or effect are irrelevant to an express advocacy
analysis); Federal Election Comm'n v. Christian Coalition, 52 F. Supp. 2d 45, 61 (D.D.C.
1999) (stating that an advertisement must contain an "explicit directive" that is to be
ascertained by the words used in order to be subject to regulation); Faucher v. Federal
Election Comm'n, 928 F.2d 468, 472 (1st Cir. 1991) (noting that the Supreme Court
intended to avoid constitutional questions by laying down an explicit test); Federal
Election Comm'n v. Cent. Long Island Tax Reform Immediately Comm., 616 F.2d 45, 53
(2d Cir. 1980) (stating that the FEC's "intentions" test would nullify the Buckley decision).
16. 168 F.3d 705 (4th Cir. 1999). In North Carolina Right to Life, the court held
section 14A "unconstitutionally vague and overbroad" because North Carolina's
definition of a political committee included those organizations that incidentally engage in
express advocacy. 168 F.3d at 713. Section 14 defined "political committees" and
prohibited them from accepting monetary contributions exceeding one hundred dollars
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court tested its constitutionality by applying the express advocacy
test.17 The court strictly adhered to the test requiring "express words
of advocacy" in invalidating section 12A.1s Section 12A stated that
the intention behind advertisement expenditures was to be
considered in determining whether their sponsoring organizations
19
were subject to statutory reporting requirements. The language of
the statute clearly ran afoul of the express advocacy test established
in Buckley, and the Fourth Circuit indicated that it was not ready to
2°
alter the standard for the regulation of political speech.
The Fourth Circuit's decision not to create an exception to the
express advocacy test will have implications for both the campaign
finance reform movement and legislation under consideration by
Perry sends a clear message that efforts to restrict
Congress.2
political speech that only indirectly target candidates will not
withstand judicial scrutiny under the present framework. The
decision also highlights some courts' present unwillingness to
abandon current case law in favor of popular reform. This trend does
not bode well for supporters of the recurrent Bipartisan Campaign
Finance Reform Act of 2001,2 which may eventually win approval in
Congress only to be defeated in the courts.P The bill regulates
unless it was in the form of a "check, draft, or money order." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163278.14(b) (1999). "Political committees" must report the contributor's name to any
recipient of funds. Id. § 163-278.14(c). The statute's use of the word "incidental" made

the regulation broader than what the Buckley test allowed. North Carolina Right to Life,

168 F.3d at 712-13. The court also determined that the statute juxtaposed express and
issue advocacy, indicating that a political committee included both. Id.
17. Perry v. Bartlett, 231 F.3d 155,160-62 (4th Cir. 2000) (per curiam).
18. Id.

19. This statute required organizations to disclose expenditures naming a candidate or
prospective candidate unless the material is "solely informational and is not intended to
advocate the election or defeat of a candidate." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.12A (1999).
The statute stated that it was reluctant to establish a test that would create an ambiguous
standard open for interpretation. Id.
20. Perry, 231 F.3d at 160-62.
21. Curbing the influence of soft money and other indirect support and opposition to
candidates is a top priority for campaign finance reform advocates. See Trevor Potter,
Buckley v. Valeo, PoliticalDisclosure and the FirstAmendment, 33 AKRON L. REV. 71,
78-79 (1999) (stating that issue advocacy is one of the most contentious parts of the
campaign finance reform debate); Ornstein, supra note 2 (advocating the inclusion of issue
advocacy in campaign finance reforms); Roth, supra note 3 (discussing the popularity of
banning soft money).
22. S. 27,107th Cong. (2001), LEXIS 2001 S. 27.
23. Several versions of this bill, sponsored by Senators John McCain and Russ
Feingold, have been introduced in previous Congresses. However, the bill has failed to
secure passage each time. See Redish, supra note 12, at 788 nn.41-43 (discussing the
history of the McCain-Feingold campaign finance reform bills); Dante Chinni, McCain's
Gambit: Sway Washington From Arkansas,CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Jan. 31, 2001,
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electioneering communications, which are defined as broadcast
communications to members of the general electorate that clearly
identify a candidate and are made within sixty days before a general
election or thirty days before a primary election.2 4 The Senate
remains conscious of the potential unconstitutionality of this
regulation, as evidenced by the insertion of an alternative definition
of electioneering communications in the bill.25 The bill states that in
the event a court holds that pre-election candidate identification is
too broad to constitute express advocacy and therefore
unconstitutional, electioneering communications will be defined as
any broadcast that "promotes or supports" or "attacks or opposes" a
candidate for office and which has no other plausible meaning but an
"exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate."26 The
language in the alternative statutory definition seems to leave an
interpretative role for the courts in determining whether the
advertisement was intended to sway a voter's decision, something the

express advocacy test was designed to avoid 7
The companion bill pending in the House of Representatives
attempts to regulate issue advertisements through a similar definition

of express advocacy.28 The House bill begins its definition of express
at 2 (stating that each time a version of the bill was introduced, it received a majority of
support, only to die because of a filibuster); Jim Drinkard, It's Strrrrike 3 for Campaign
Finance Reform if Senate Supporters Fail to Break Filibuster by Republicans, USA
TODAY, Sept. 11, 1998, at 6A (detailing the difficulty for the bill in the 105th Congress);
Bob Hohler, Senate Foils CampaignFinanceBills; Republican FilibusterPrevails, BOSTON
GLOBE, Oct. 20,1999, at Al (discussing the history of defeats for campaign finance reform
bills).
While supporters of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act have recently
come closer to passing the bill by winning approval in the Senate, the bill stalled in the
House of Representatives, threatening to kill it once again if supporters are unable to
revive it. See Campaign Reform Petition Started, WASH. POST, July 31, 2001, at A04
(discussing the efforts of campaign finance reform supporters to revive the Bipartisan
Campaign Finance Reform Act through a discharge petition); Greg Miller, House Backers
Move Closer to Forcing Vote on Campaign FinanceReform, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2001, at
A15 (discussing efforts of House members to revive the campaign finance bill); Norman
Ornstein, Reformers Bloodied But Not Bowed, L.A. TIMES, July 22, 2001, at M6
(discussing the progress of the campaign finance bill in the 107th Congress). Even if no
campaign finance reform bills are enacted into law by the 107th Congress, the
constitutional issues underlying the current debate will remain pertinent and potentially
determinative of any eventual campaign finance reform that seeks to regulate issue
advocacy.
24. S.27 § 201(f)(3)(A)(i)(I)-(III)(2001), LEXIS 2001 S.27.
25. Id. § 201(f)(3)(A)(ii).
26. Id.
27. See Faucher v. Federal Election Comm'n, 928 F.2d 468, 472 (1st Cir. 1991);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 (1976) (per curiam).
28. H.R. 380, 107th Cong. (2001), LEXIS 2001 H.R. 380.
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advocacy by mirroring the Supreme Court's use of words and phrases

29
designed to advocate the election or defeat of a candidate.
However, express advocacy under this bill also includes

advertisements "referring to one or more clearly identified candidates
in a paid [radio or television] advertisement that is transmitted ...
within 60 calendar days preceding the date of an election of the
candidate.

' 30

The broadest definition of express advocacy offered in

the bill includes communications that express "unmistakable and
unambiguous support or opposition to one" candidate.3 ' In spite of
this expansive definition, the bill does include some limitations and
exceptions. For example, voter guides that offer only unbiased
information in an uncoordinated manner, without any express words
that could reasonably be perceived to support an individual
candidate's election or defeat, are unregulated.3 2

Any law purporting to regulate issue advocacy advertisements
using an interpretative mechanism such as the one found in pending
campaign finance reform bills would probably violate the express
advocacy test and be held unconstitutional under existing case law.33
Perry demonstrates that courts will closely scrutinize any legislation
that seeks to restrict issue advertisements or broaden the definition of

express advocacy, thereby burdening political speech.' The express
advocacy test will most likely require significant broadening or

29. Id. § 201(b)(20)(A)(i). These words must be used in a "context [that] can have no
reasonable meaning other than to advocate the election or defeat of ...candidates."
Compare § 201(b)(20)(A)(i) (using a contextual test for determining if political speech can
be regulated), with Buckley, 424 U.S. at 43 (requiring words of express advocacy to permit
the regulation of political speech).
30. Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2001, H.R. 380, 107th Cong.
§ 201(b)(20)(A)(iii) (2001), LEXIS 2001 H.R. 380.
31. Id. § 201(b)(20)(A)(iii).
32. Id. § 201(b)(20)(B)(i)-(iii).
33. See Briffault, supra note 2, at 1736-37 (stating that issue advocacy will likely be at
the heart of any constitutional challenge to pending campaign finance legislation); Richard
A. Davey, Jr., Comment, "Buckleying" the System: Is Meaningful Campaign Finance
Reform Possible Under Reigning FirstAmendment Jurisprudence?,34 GONz. L. REv. 509,
523 (1998-1999) (stating that any law restricting issue advocacy will likely be struck down).
As the bill was considered in Congress, members questioned the bill's ability to withstand
constitutional scrutiny. 147 CONG. REc. S3225 (2001) (statement of Sen. Nickles arguing
that certain parts of the campaign finance bill will be held unconstitutional); 147 CONG.
REC. S3334, S3335 (2001) (statement of Sen. Kerry predicting that the Supreme Court will
not reverse itself to allow regulation of issue advocacy).
34. See Perry v. Bartlett, 231 F.3d 155, 160-62 (4th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); Gora,
supra note 5, at 28 (stating that current campaign finance reform bills seeking to regulate
issue advocacy are "flatly unconstitutional under settled First Amendment rules").
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elimination altogether if new campaign finance regulation is to meet
35
the strict scrutiny test.
The current political climate could give rise to new and
compelling arguments which will convince the Supreme Court that it
is time to abandon the test applied in Perry in order to allow more
meaningful campaign finance regulation.3 6 Under the current
framework, political contributions are characterized as speech rather
than conduct or property, thereby subjecting them to the "exacting

scrutiny required by the First Amendment." 37 The first argument for
regulating issue advocacy expenditures flows from the government's
compelling interest in preventing corruption and the appearance
35. See Davey, supra note 33, at 528 (stating that reform advocates should attempt to
alter the current constitutional parameters for regulating campaign financing before
attempting to institute reforms).
36. See Perry, 155 F.3d at 160; see Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377,
408-09 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that the soft money system creates
dangers and is dispiriting to voters). Justice Kennedy noted that Congress might be able
to craft campaign finance regulation that could regulate contributions and expenditures,
thus alleviating some of the problems plaguing the system. Id at 409-410; John C. Bonifaz
et al., Challenging Buckley v. Valeo: A Legal Strategy, 33 AKRON. L. REv. 39, 69 (1999)
(arguing that the Supreme Court has become dissatisfied with Buckley and may be ready
to proceed in a new direction if new and better articulated compelling government
interests are presented to the Court); Briffault, supra note 2, at 1730-31 (arguing that the
future of the Buckley framework is in doubt). Justice Stevens supports discarding the
Buckley framework and instead characterizing campaign contributions as property.
Nixon, 528 U.S. at 398 (Stevens, J., concurring). He argues that this approach would
permit the analysis of campaign finance regulation under substantive due process
principles and implies that such analysis would give the Court a greater ability to regulate
the activity. Id at 398-99 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Erin Buford Vinett, Recent
Development, FirstAmendment-Campaign Finance Reform-The Supreme Court Halts
the Eighth Circuit'sInvalidation of State Campaign ContributionLimits: Nixon v. Shrink
Missouri Government Political Action Committee, 120 S.Ct. 897 (2000), 23 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 243, 265-66 (2000) (discussing Justice Stevens's premise for
campaign finance regulation). But see Davey, supra note 33, at 523 (arguing that the
Court may not be receptive to restricting issue advocacy). The case for expanding or
overturning Buckley has arguably become more persuasive in light of the alleged
fundraising improprieties of former President Bill Clinton and criticism of President
George W. Bush's massive campaign war chest that have raised concerns about the
integrity of the democratic electoral process.
37. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,16 (1976) (per curiam); FEC v. Colorado Republican
Fed. Campaign Comm. (Colorado Republican I1), 121 S.Ct. 2351, 2358 (2001). Strict
scrutiny requires that any government action that burdens First Amendment rights be
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest. Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d
633, 638 (8th Cir. 1995); Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC v. Manpin, 922 F. Supp. 1413, 1420
(E.D. Mo. 1996). Since issue advocacy is characterized as speech, the government must
make this demonstration in order to be consistent with the constitutional mandate. In
Buckley, the Court determined that the prevention of corruption was the sole justification
for allowing regulation of campaign financing. 424 U.S. at 47-48; Richard Briffault,
CampaignFinance, the Partiesand the Court: A Comment on Colorado Republican Fed.
Campaign Comm. v. Federal Elections Comm'n, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 91, 96 (1997).
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thereof in the political arena?8 Permitting issue advocacy groups to
accept unlimited contributions and then spend unlimited amounts
indirectly supporting or opposing a candidate undermines the spirit of
campaign finance regulation.39 Issue advertisements often serve the
same purpose as express advertisements, yet issue advertisements are
40
not regulated and their sponsors are unaccountable. Campaigns and
4
issue groups can coordinate their activities without violating the law. '
As these groups are permitted to influence the outcome of elections
through independent expenditures, the potential for corruption
grows. When the activities of such groups impact elections and policy
formulation, the accountability of candidates benefiting from the
advocacy is diminished.4a This situation threatens the integrity of our

38. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27 (discussing the prevention and appearance of
corruption as compelling state interests); Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494
U.S. 652, 658 (1986); Federal Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action
Comm., 470 U.S. 480,496-97 (1985); Daniel H. Lowenstein, CampaignFinance, Race, and
Equality, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1535, 1539 n.18 (2001) (stating that corruption is a major theme
in the campaign finance reform debate); Sullivan, supra note 13, at 678-82 (arguing that
corruption is a reason for limiting political contributions).
39. Briffault, supra note 2, at 1737-38 (stating that issue "advertisements have
immunized themselves from regulation"); Anthony Corrado, On the Issue of Issue
Advocacy: A Comment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1803, 1808 (1999) (discussing the detrimental
effects that issue advocacy has on our current law due to their unaccountability).
40. Corrado, supra note 39 (discussing the effects of issue advocacy); Briffault, supra
note 2, at 1739-40 (stating that independent expenditures present the same danger as
contributions); Briffault, supra note 37, at 98 (stating that expenditures can create the
same obligation to the spender as a contribution).
41. See ELIZABETH DREW, POLITICS AND MONEY 136 (1983) (stating that there are
numerous ways "independent" campaigns can collude with candidates); Joseph
Lieberman, The Politicsof Money and the Road to Self-Destruction, 16 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 425, 447-48 n.63 (1997) (discussing Bob Dole's strategy to combat his lack of
presidential campaign funds through the use of issue advertisements favoring his
candidacy, but stopping short of expressly advocating his election); Davey, supra note 33,
at 521 (discussing President Bill Clinton's ability to "[bend] express advocacy into issue
advocacy"). Coordination can also take place by simply observing where one organization
decides to advertise and then strategically planning a separate advertising effort that
targets a different market or voter base. Thus, the campaign effort, united by one goal but
officially uncoordinated, can better utilize its resources to elect its candidate.
42. See Lillian R. BeVier, The Issue of Issue Advocacy: An Economic, Political,and
Constitutional Analysis, 85 VA. L. REV. 1761, 1784-85 (1999) (stating that issue
advertisements can set the agenda); Briffault, supra note 37, at 97 (noting that
contributions raise the specter of corruption); Corrado, supra note 39, at 1808 (discussing
issue advocacy and candidate accountability); David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and
Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1369 (1994) ("To the extent that
large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential
officeholders, the integrity of our system of representative government is undermined.").
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system of government because elected officials' accountability to the
people is a "central assumption of our electoral democracy."43
Currently, the public lacks the necessary information to evaluate
an issue advertisement in light of the candidate it supports or
opposes.' Unlimited campaign contributions in the form of issue
advertisements arguably buy the same access to policymaking that a
direct contribution would bring, yet issue advertisements are
unlimited in size and can potentially facilitate greater access. 45 Thus,
these contributors should be considered part of the campaign because
they reap the benefits of electing their candidates through subsequent
input on policy formulation and implementation.46 The more money
spent, the greater the potential for corruption and impropriety, as
discussed by the Buckley court.47 Nevertheless, the Court's reluctance
43. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978) (defining
corruption to include undermining the people's confidence in the democratic process);
Briffault, supra note 37, at 97 (discussing the threat to the democratic system's integrity);
Corrado, supra note 39, at 1808 (discussing the harmful effects of issue advocacy).
44. Corrado, supra note 39, at 1808 (discussing the lack of disclosure requirements).
45. See Briffault, supra note 37, at 98 (raising the possibility that "a candidate who
benefits from an independent committee's support will feel an obligation ... comparable
to that created by a contribution"); Corrado, supra note 39, at 1808 (arguing that
unaccountability can effect decisions in office); Sullivan, supra note 13, at 678-79 (stating
that many voters perceive Congress to be controlled by the wealthy). But see FEC v.
Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (Colorado Republican II), 121 S. Ct. 2351,
2358 (2001) (quoting Buckley's finding that the absence of pre-arrangement and
coordination of expenditures reduces the danger that they may be used for improper
candidate commitments).
46. This argument becomes more plausible if campaigns are construed more broadly
to include efforts and expenditures outside the official organization. However, Buckley's
argument that "virtually every means of [political communication] requires the
expenditure of money" discourages such a broad interpretation in order to safeguard First
Amendment rights. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam). Issue
advertisements arguably constitute both contributions and expenditures, making it
difficult to classify them as subsections of the campaign for the purpose of regulating
them. See Briffault, supra note 37, at 98 (discussing the difficulty of classifying these
campaign practices).
The Supreme Court recently noted that the simplicity of the distinction between
contributions and expenditures is qualified by the use of a functional definition of
contribution, rather than a formal one. Colorado Republican II, 121 S. Ct. at 2356-57.
The current definition of contribution includes "expenditures made ... in cooperation,
consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his
authorized political committees, or their agents." 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i) (1994).
Utilizing a functional definition of contribution would potentially bring more
"expenditures" under the regulation of campaign finance laws. See Colorado Republican
11, 121 S. Ct. at 2356-57.
47. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26 (discussing the state's interest in regulating political
financing); Briffault, supra note 2, at 1741 (discussing the consideration of corruption
when regulating political speech). Professor Briffault argues that the Supreme Court has
"suggested that 'corruption' may be read to include the spending of large sums of money
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to allow regulation of the most prominent vehicles through which this
corruption can arise undermines the states' ability to address a
compelling interest.
The argument for classifying issue advertisements as part of the
actual campaign is undermined by the Supreme Court's rejection of a
4
similar argument made by the Federal Election Commission."

The

FEC believed that party expenditures are so closely linked to
candidates that any party expenditure should be presumed to be
coordinated with the party's candidate, thus subjecting the party to
contribution limits. 49

However, the Supreme Court rejected this

argument, finding that those expenditures were not more likely to
serve or appear as instruments of corruption than other private
The Court's reluctance to presume party
expenditures.50
expenditures to be associated with their candidate's campaign further
underscores the unlikelihood that courts will allow issue
advertisements to be grouped with a campaign.
The Court, however, does leave the door ajar for less
presumptive forms of this argument. The Court held "that a party's
coordinated expenditures ... may be restricted to minimize
circumvention of contribution limits."' 51 Thus, if the courts can be
persuaded to adopt a broader definition of coordination, perhaps
more functional in nature, issue advertisements may become subject
to campaign finance regulation.
The potential influence of money in the political arena gives rise
to a second compelling argument for expanding the Buckley test:
The Sixth
equal political opportunity for the entire electorate5
that have an 'undue influence on the outcome' of an election" and undermine the
confidence of the electorate in the democratic process. Id. (quoting First Nat'l Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978)). A broader reading of "corruption" and a
more inclusive consideration of its potential sources should necessarily include
independent expenditures since they constitute a growing percentage of the advocacy
expenditures made during election cycles. Thus, in order to accomplish the compelling
state interest of combating corruption, independent expenditures must be included within
any regulation.
48. FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (Colorado Republican 1),
518 U.S. 604, 614 (1996).
49. Id.; see also FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 28-29

& n.1 (1981).
50. Colorado Republican I, 518 U.S. at 614-16 (stating that the "independent
expression of a political party's views is [a] 'core' First Amendment activity"); see also
ColoradoRepublican 11, 121 S. Ct. at 2360.
51. ColoradoRepublican II, 121 S. Ct. at 2371.
52. See Bonifaz et al., supra note 36, at 63 (discussing political equality as a state
interest); Briffault, supra note 2, at 1734, 1738-42 (stating that corruption and equality
considerations are "closely intertwined" and difficult to distinguish).
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Circuit articulated this argument in Kruse v. City of Cincinnati.3
where the court struck down a city ordinance that sought to limit
money's influence in the democratic process 4 The court rejected the
argument that the government's interest in providing a level playing
field for elections was sufficiently compelling to justify state
regulation burdening political speech.5 5 The court directly relied on
Buckley in rejecting this argument, stating that "the concept that
government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society
in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to
the First Amendment." 56 The court refused, however, to recognize
that disparities in financial political expression foster political
inequality and undermine the First Amendment. 7
Issue advocacy groups must be included within campaign finance
regulations to prevent "independent" organizations from doing the
candidates' work and providing avenues for contributors to duplicate
53. 142 F.3d 907, 918-19 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1001 (1998)
(invalidating Cincinnati's limits on campaign expenditures). Although the Supreme Court
declined to review the lower court's decision to enjoin the city's campaign finance
regulation, the case is another example of increasing support for revisiting Buckley and its
ban on spending limits. See id. at 918-19 (discussing the attention Kruse's arguments have
received by some members of the Supreme Court); see Bonifaz et al., supranote 36, at 5154 (discussing the importance of Kruse in the continuing campaign finance debate).
54. Kruse, 142 F.3d at 909. The ordinance limited the amount a candidate for a city
office could spend in an election cycle to three times the compensation provided for the
relevant office. Id. While expenditures are different from contributions and not
constitutionally limited, the arguments found in Kruse are applicable to the debate over
issue advocacy regulation. See id.;
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20-23 (1976) (per
curiam). The distinction between contributions and expenditures is difficult to discern
because the expenditures of one person or group can serve the same purpose as a
contribution to another. See Briffault, supra note 37, at 98-100 (discussing the difficulty in
applying the contribution and expenditure distinction).
55. Kruse, 142 F.3d at 917-18. The city applied this argument in four ways: 1)
candidates lacking access to wealth are excluded from running for office; 2) since costs
prohibit some individuals from running for office, the general public is deprived of a full
slate of candidates; 3) voters are deprived from hearing the positions of candidates with
lesser resources; and 4) voters lacking access to wealth are drowned out by voters with
such access and the influence it buys. Id.at 917.
56. Id.at 917 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49).
57. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 221-28 (1971) (concluding that
disproportionate wealth can undermine the value of voting); Ronald Dworkin, The Curse
of American Politics,N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Oct. 17, 1996, at 19 (arguing that citizens of
democracy should be equal as participants); J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollutionof
Politics: Is the FirstAmendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
609, 625 (1982) (arguing that concentrated wealth drowns out any opponents and defeats
the purpose of direct democracy). But see Daniel R. Ortiz, Law and the PoliticalProcess:
The Democratic Paradox of Campaign Finance Reform, 50 STAN. L. REV. 893, 902-03
(1998) (arguing that the views of poorer candidates do not lose because they are drowned
out, but because they are not considered by the electorate).
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their expressive rights.58 In order to realize the ideals of a democratic
system, all participants must be assured an equal voice.59 Political
equality serves as the foundation of our democratic system. 60 The
necessity of providing equal opportunity to communicate ideas
among the public should allow the regulation of political speech to
ensure this end.6 1 Campaign contribution limits on ali sources would

ensure that no one person or group could "speak" with a louder voice
simply because he or she is wealthy. It would ensure that the
capability to exercise one's First Amendment right to political speech
is not a function of wealth. Wealthier individuals and organizations
would no longer have an inherent advantage by being able to
purchase the right to be heard. 62 Limiting all expenditures and
58. See Briffault, supra note 2, at 1739-40 (stating that independent expenditures and
direct contributions present the same dangers to the electoral system); Corrado, supra
note 39 and accompanying text (arguing that express and issue advertisements serve the
same purpose and achieve the same result).
59. See Bonifaz et al., supra note 36, at 60; Colloquia, Campaign Finance Reform:
Law and Politics: ConstitutionalImplicationsof Campaign FinanceReform, 8 ADMIN. L.J.
AM. U. 161, 173 (1994) (arguing that the wealth-based system violates the equal protection
rights of less affluent citizens).
60. See Dworkin, supra note 57, at 19 (arguing the importance of political equality);
Wright, supra note 57, at 611 (criticizing Buckley's equation of money and speech).
61. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 804 (1978) (White, J., dissenting)
(arguing that speech rights may be abridged when the state chooses the "the best possible
balance" between "competing First Amendment interests"). Justice White argued that
the promotion of political equality required the prevention of domination by actors such
as corporations when issues of importance to them were in discussion. Id at 809 (White,
J., dissenting); see also David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance
Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1383 (1994) (arguing that the "one person, one vote"
principle is harmonious with the First Amendment); Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality
and Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1390, 1392 (1994) (arguing that "one
person, one vote" promotes political equality). But see Gora, supra note 5, at 26-27
(arguing that trying to equalize political opportunity through limiting political speech is
ineffective); Lowenstein, supra note 38, at 1539 (discounting the notion that campaign
finance reforms can be justified by the notion of equity).
State regulation of political speech to ensure equal access is particularly necessary
when the medium for the speech is limited. An example of a limited medium is media
markets, which can offer only a finite amount of communications access to candidates,
who must then vie for attractive time slots. When this limited resource can be
monopolized by candidates or groups with more money, the exchange of ideas and the
democratic process is stifled. Freezing competitors out of a limited resource effectively
chills speech. See Bonifaz et al., supra note 36, at 66 (discussing the scarce nature of
advertising media). However, the Sixth Circuit has rejected this argument, stating that it is
impermissible to abridge the First Amendment rights of some in favor of others. Kruse,
142 F.3d at 917 (rejecting this argument as a compelling state interest). But see Red Lion
Broad. Co. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969) (stating that the
government must abridge the speech rights of some for effective communication when the
medium is limited); Bonifaz et al, supra note 36, at 65-68 (discussing the limited medium
communication argument as a potential compelling interest for state regulation).
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contributions by issue-oriented organizations promoting or opposing
candidates will promote equity by leveling the playing field among
participants in the political process. 63 Although this approach would
extend current regulation to a different and broader area of political
speech, re-characterizing issue advocacy contributions and
expenditures as something other than protected political speech
would be the most effective means of effecting a change in the current
law.
If the courts continue to reject these justifications for the
regulation of issue advertisements, an argument can be made that
their regulation could nonetheless meet the Buckley test.' Because
issue advocacy advertisements often support or oppose a candidate,
they could be viewed as a form of express advocacy. In Federal
Election Commission v. Furgatch,65 the Ninth Circuit took a step in

this direction when it deviated slightly from the case law exemplified
in Perry by noting that express words of advocacy were to be
considered in the context of the entire advertisement.' The court
stated that "speech need not include any of the words listed in
Buckley to be express advocacy."'6 7 The speech must, "when read as a
whole, and with limited reference to external events, be susceptible of

no other reasonable interpretation but as an exhortation to vote for

62. Ortiz, supranote 57, at 901 (arguing that the influence of money causes officials to
overvalue contributors' interests); Sullivan, supra note 13, at 680-81 (discussing
disproportionate responsiveness to wealthier individuals). Even in Buckley, the Court
recognized that more money meant more speech. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976)
(per curiam) (stating that reducing the amount of money that can be spent on political
communication is a limit on speech). The Court's primary concern in establishing
protection seemed to focus on the amount of speech while discounting concerns about
equal political opportunity. See id.
63. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67 (stating that disclosure enables the evaluation of
candidates); see Bonifaz et al., supra note 36, at 60-61 (maintaining that regulation must
be more than marginal or it will have no effect). However, such restrictions would
probably not survive strict scrutiny under the current judicial framework. See Briffault,
supra note 37, at 98 (stating that donations may create an obligation to the spender);
Sullivan, supranote 13, at 680-81 (discussing disproportionate responsiveness).
64. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 (establishing the express advocacy test).
65. 807 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1987) (discussing the importance of "considering
speech as a whole" and the need to make inferences "from the relation of one part of
speech to another").
66. Id; Perry v. Bartlett, 231 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). The Ninth
Circuit's decision does not materially alter the express advocacy test followed in Pery;
however, it does slightly deviate from the bright-line test. The significance of this
deviation is not the existence of a circuit split, but an indication that some courts may be
opening up to a contextual consideration when applying the express advocacy test.
67. Furgatch,807 F.2d at 864.
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or against a specific candidate. ' 68 Applying the Ninth Circuit's
description of contextual consideration, the strictness of the express
advocacy test is lessened, allowing for a broader determination of
what constitutes political speech worthy of regulation. When this
contextual framework is applied to issue advocacy communications,
the indirect support or opposition to a candidate can be gleaned from
the context of the information imparted to the public. While the
express words "vote for John Doe" might be absent, the contextual
message might establish express advocacy by containing an
exhortation to vote for or against a candidate. Inquiring into the
actual impact of the communication arguably avoids the nebulous
question of intent and resulting constitutional questions, which the
69
courts disdain.
The Ninth Circuit's slightly different approach to express
advocacy has not gone unnoticed. In FederalElection Commission v.
Christian Action Network, the Fourth Circuit critically analyzed
Furgatch's reasoning and acknowledged the Ninth Circuit's
consideration of contextual meaning before upholding an issue
advertisement against an FEC challenge. 70 Campaign finance reform
legislation pending before Congress also incorporates the Furgatch
test by employing contextual meaning to determine whether a
communication is express advocacy, thus permitting regulation and
mandatory disclosure.71
The Ninth Circuit's discussion in Furgatch presents a good
starting point for formulating a new approach to campaign finance
regulation. The language in Furgatchshould be employed to read an
objective test into Buckley's express advocacy test to determine
whether a reasonable potential voter would perceive the
advertisement as opposing or supporting a candidate.72 If the voter
68. Id. The test differs from the express advocacy test laid out in Buckley because it
looks to contextual content rather than explicit words. The court in Furgatch also stated
that "speech is 'express' for present purposes if its message is unmistakable and
unambiguous, suggestive of only one plausible meaning." lI& From this interpretation,
one can argue that all subsequent courts applying the express advocacy standard of
Buckley have construed the test and the court's example of words too narrowly.
69. Faucher v. Federal Election Comm'n, 928 F.2d 468, 472 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating
that the Court sought to avoid constitutional questions by establishing the bright-line test
in Buckley).
70. 110 F.3d 1049, 1052-55 (1997) (analyzing the Ninth Circuit's slightly broader
interpretation of the express advocacy test in Furgatch).
71. S. 27, 107th Cong. § 201(f)(3)(A)(ii)(2001), LEXIS 2001 S. 27 (using the language
"exhortation to vote" as used in Furgatch); H.R. 380, 107th Cong. § 201(b)(20)(A)(iii)
(2001), LEXIS 2001 H.R. 380 (using the language "unmistakable and unambiguous").
72. Furgatch,807 F.2d at 863.
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would perceive the advertisement as advocating for or against a
particular candidate, then it would be subject to state regulation
similar to any other advertisement constituting express advocacy.73
An objective test would permit regulation of issue advertisements by
evaluating the advertisement in its entire context. The test would
permit a minimal attempt to contextualize the words and abide by the
spirit of the rule, which is constrained by overly strict interpretations.
The express advocacy test would be broadened slightly, but as long as
the express words are construed no broader than necessary to achieve
the state's interest in preventing corruption in the political process,
the bright-line motivations for retaining the test without modification
By bringing independent issue
would be safeguarded.74
advertisements into the regulation of political speech, money's impact
on the democratic process would be reduced and the true spirit of
campaign finance reform upheld7 Candidates would no longer be
able to rely on "shadow campaigns" supplementing their central
campaign efforts or picking up the tab once they drain their coffers.76

The result would be a more level playing field for both the candidates
and the entire electorate to discuss the issues.
While courts have shied away from varied applications of the
express advocacy test, the public's appetite for campaign finance
reform and recent breakdowns in the letter and spirit of the system
affords the Supreme Court the opportunity to rethink its narrow
New, potentially
approach regarding issue advertisements.
compelling state interests present the United States Supreme Court
with the tools it needs to make a clean break from the express
advocacy test. The Court could also embrace campaign finance
reform and remedy the mistakes courts have made in construing
express advocacy too narrowly by expanding the definition or
application of express advocacy.7 7 However, absent a shift in the
73. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42.
74. See Furgatch,807 F.2d at 861 (stating that Buckley does not draw a "bright and
unambiguous line"). The Ninth Circuit repeated the Supreme Court's directive that
"where First Amendment concerns are present, we must construe the words of the
regulatory statute precisely and narrowly, only as far as is necessary to further the
purposes." Id.
75. See Corrado, supra note 39, at 1812.
76. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (describing instances where issue
advocacy campaigns have all but been part of formal campaigns). An expanded
interpretation of "coordination" or a more functional definition of "contribution" would
also help combat the supplemental campaigns. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying
text (discussing coordinated expenditures and a functionalistic approach).
77. See, e.g., Faucher v. Federal Election Comm'n, 928 F.2d 468, 472 (1st Cir. 1991)
(noting that the Supreme Court intended to avoid constitutional questions by laying down

2001]

A TEST FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM

1803

constitutional parameters, words of political advocacy will continue to
receive the strict interpretation employed by the Fourth Circuit in
Perry,78 effectively defeating any attempt at implementing true
campaign finance reform.
CHRISTOPHER J. AYERS

an explicit test); Federal Election Comm'n v. Christian Coalition, 52 F. Supp. 2d 45, 61
(D.D.C. 1999) (stating that an advertisement must contain an "explicit directive" that is to
be ascertained by the words used in order to be subject to regulation).
78. Perry v. Bartlett, 231 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 2000) (per curiam).

